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Abstract This study addressed the relationship between
sense of personal identity and thinking dispositions such as
need for cognition, reflection, and integrative self-knowledge
as well as modes of coping with self-related discrepancies
through either excessive assimilation or accommodation.
Participants were 544 young adults. The correlation and path
analyses revealed, as expected, that need for cognition and
integrative self-knowledge positively influenced one’s sense
of identity, while over-responsiveness to discrepant informa-
tion about the self influenced it negatively. The effects of
reflection and imperviousness to discrepancies appeared more
complicated and varied. Together, the findings confirm the
importance of cognitive-motivational variables in the devel-
opment and maintenance of a sense of identity, and suggest
that gender differences in their relative significance may de-
serve additional research attention.
Keywords Cognitive-motivational dispositions . Sense of
identity . Gender differences
Introduction
The notion that the identity formation process requires certain
cognitive capacities is well-established in psychological liter-
ature (e.g., Hilgard 1949; Inhelder and Piaget 1958;
Maruszewski 2010). Erikson himself (Erikson 1968) noted
the important role cognitive processes, such as introspection,
insight, and reality testing, play in identity formation. Based
mainly on the work of Piaget (1977) and Erikson (1968), a
number of authors have made propositions about how identity
formation and maintenance relates to cognitive functioning
(e.g., Berzonsky 1991; Bosma and Kunnen 2001; Breakwell
1993; Grotevant 1987; Kerpelman et al. 1997; Whitbourne
1986). Moreover, several studies directly linked identity de-
velopment and outcomes with individual differences in cog-
nitive functioning (e.g., Klaczynski et al. 1998; Neimeyer and
Metzler 1994; Rowe 1980).
Drawing upon the cognitive-processing perspective, this
study’s purpose was to propose and test a more comprehensive
model of cognitive-motivational mechanisms as explanatory
factors of a sense of personal identity. The investigation thus
attempts to extend the study of cognitive determinants of per-
sonal identity by following the motivated cognition perspective
(i.e., how people’s reasoning is affected by their motives to
arrive at particular outcomes and to adopt particular strategies
of information processing). The model identifies several
cognitive-motivational characteristics that might be relevant to
forming and maintaining a sense of identity, i.e., need for cog-
nition, reflection, integrative self-knowledge, and impervious-
ness (excessive assimilation) and over-responsiveness (exces-
sive accommodation) to discrepant experiences or information
about the self. Among above listed dispositions, need for cog-
nition is considered as non-specific, in the sense that it is not
specifically aimed towards a certain object, as opposed to the
remaining ones, for which the object is the self.
Sense of Identity
Although current theories of identity (e.g., Berzonsky 1991;
Luyckx et al. 2007; McAdams 1996; Vignoles et al. 2006)
have gone beyond Eriksonian thinking, they all seem to agree
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with the spirit of Erikson’s (1980) work that a primary func-
tion of identity is to provide one with a sense of inner coher-
ence and continuity. For this research, the sense of personal
identity is defined as a comprehensive, intuitive and reflective
stance toward oneself. It corresponds to the recurring modes
of experiencing oneself-as-subject and is co-determined by
the conscious self-representations, those that an individual
considers most representative of oneself and most important
(Pilarska 2014; Pilarska and Suchańska 2013a). This view is
consistent with the assumption that self-identification can be
attained in two ways: by experiencing oneself in relation to the
world and other people, and by interpreting and reasoning
from these experiences towards explicit self-descriptions
(Epstein 2003; Trzebińska 2002). Such understood sense of
identity is a multifaceted phenomenon comprising several
identity-related senses: sense of having inner contents
(thoughts, feelings, etc.), sense of uniqueness, sense of one’s
own boundaries, sense of coherence, sense of continuity over
time, and sense of self-worth (e.g., Erikson 1968, 1980; Oleś
2008; Pilarska 2014; Sokolik 1996; Vignoles et al. 2006). The
healthy and mature sense of identity requires the development
and maintenance of all of them (Sokolik 1996).
Need for Cognition
Need for cognition is a personality construct that concerns
dispositional differences in cognitive motivation. It refers to
individuals’ tendencies to engage in and enjoy effortful cog-
nitive activity (Cacioppo and Petty 1982). High-need-for-
cognition individuals Bnaturally tend to seek, acquire, think
about, and reflect back on information to make sense of stim-
uli, relationships, and events in their world^, whereas low-
need-for-cognition individuals have little motivation for cog-
nitively effortful tasks, and prefer to rely on others’ judgments
and cognitive heuristics (Cacioppo et al. 1996, p. 198).
Many studies demonstrated that differences in need for
cognition are associated with information-processing and
problem-solving strategies (e.g., Cacioppo and Petty 1982;
Cacioppo et al. 1983; Haddock et al. 2008; Ruiter et al.
2004; Verplanken et al. 1992) as well as with personality traits,
including the Big Five (e.g., Fleischhauer et al. 2010;
Sadowski and Cogburn 1997; see, for review, Cacioppo
et al. 1996). Particularly noteworthy are findings suggesting
that need for cognition contributes to coherence across differ-
ent areas of functioning. High-need-for-cognition individuals
tend to have more resistant attitudes (Haugtvedt and Petty
1992), exhibit stronger attitude-behavior consistency
(Cacioppo et al. 1986), and are more able to resolve conflict
and reconcile contradictory information about attitude objects
(Thompson et al. 1995).
The cognitive skills used by those high in need for cogni-
tion would be especially helpful in constructing identity.
Accordingly, research showed that high-need-for-cognition
individuals are more likely to be at a higher level of identity
development, assessed in terms of Berzonsky’s identity styles,
Marcia’s identity statuses, and resolution of identity crisis as
defined by Erikson (Berzonsky and Sullivan 1992; Njus and
Johnson 2008), and they report greater self-concept clarity
(Campbell et al. 1996).
Reflection
Dispositional self-consciousness, an enduring tendency to direct
attention toward oneself, has been of ongoing interest since
Fenigstein et al. (1975) developed the Self-Consciousness
Scale. However, the overall pattern of findings relating self-
awareness to psychological adjustment is ambiguous – a phe-
nomenon referred to as the self-absorption paradox or sadder-
but-wiser effect (Alloy and Abramson 1979; Fleckhammer
2004; Trapnell and Campbell 1999). To reconcile the conflicting
findings, several authors differentiated between functional and
dysfunctional forms of self-consciousness (e.g., Anderson et al.
1996; Burnkrant and Page 1984;Martin and Debus 1999;Mittal
and Balasubramanian 1987). In a similar vein, Trapnell and
Campbell (1999) proposed two motivationally distinct disposi-
tions confounded in private self-consciousness, i.e., rumination
(neurotically motivated) and reflection (motivated by self-
curiosity and search for self-knowledge). Numerous studies sup-
ported this proposition and confirmed reflection as a more adap-
tive form of self-focus (e.g., Joireman et al. 2002; Harrington
and Loffredo 2010; Luyckx et al. 2007; Luyckx et al. 2008;
Thomsen et al. 2011). However, its effects are not solely positive
ones (Elliott and Coker 2008; Takano and Tanno 2009).
The definition of reflection alone suggests its relevance to
identity formation. Indeed, previous studies found it positively
associated with need for self-knowledge (Trapnell and
Campbell 1999) and adaptive identity processes (Johnson
and Nozick 2011; Luyckx et al. 2007; Luyckx et al. 2008).
Still, there is some controversy since reflection was found
negatively related to self-concept clarity (Campbell et al.
1996; Csank and Conway 2004; Johnson and Nozick 2011).
Integrative Self-Knowledge
Proceeding on the assumption that self-knowledge is a process
organized in time, Ghorbani et al. (2008) conceptualized inte-
grative self-knowledge Bas an adaptive and empowering at-
tempt of the self to understand its experience across time to
achieve desired outcomes^ (p. 397). Research supports the
benefits of integrative self-knowledge in enhancing mood
and well-being while decreasing anxiety, depression, and var-
ious stress indicators (Ghorbani et al. 2008, 2013a, b); and
relates integrative self-knowledge to broad personality traits
such as the Big Five (Tahmasb et al. 2008).
It would be obvious to consider the constitutive relevance
of integrative self-knowledge for the identity formation
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process. After all, countless theorists have pointed out that to
have an identity is to achieve a sense of continuity over time
(e.g., Erikson 1968; Goth et al. 2012; Sokolik 1996; Vignoles
et al. 2006). Also, a multitude of research in narrative theory
has emphasized that identity difficulties often result from
one’s inability to construct a life story that makes sense –
integrates interpretations of the past with the present self and
provides life with purpose (e.g., McAdams 1996; McLean
2008; Singer 2004). Studies directly examining the effects of
integrative self-knowledge on identity are scarce, but the
available evidence indicates a positive correlation between
integrative self-knowledge and Eriksonian measure of identity
(Ghorbani et al. 2010).
Assimilative and Accommodative Coping
Piaget’s (1977) theory includes assimilation and accom-
modation as the fundamental and complementary pro-
cesses guiding cognitive development. Several identity
models apply the concepts of assimilation and accom-
modation to describe processing of self-relevant infor-
mation (e.g., Bosma and Kunnen 2001; Breakwell
1993; Grotevant 1987; Whitbourne 1986). Identity as-
similation refers to interpretation of self-relevant events
in terms of the cognitive-affective schemata that are
presently held about the self. To Whitbourne, identity
assimilation is primarily a defensive strategy that pro-
tects one’s sense of inner consistency and worth
(Whitbourne 1986). Identity accommodation is the pro-
cess of changing identity in response to experiences that
are discrepant with existing self-schemata (Kunnen et al.
2008; Whitbourne 1986). Since equilibration needs both
assimilation and accommodation, the utilization of either
process, to the exclusion of the other, is likely to lead
to maladjustment (Whitbourne 1986, 1996). The two
modes of coping recognized in this paper, impervious-
ness and over-responsiveness, each corresponds to such
extremes of assimilative and accommodative processes.
Finding a balance between assimilation and accommodation
is the optimal approach to handling identity concerns.
Identity-balanced individuals are flexible enough to acknowl-
edge and integrate changes within the self, yet structured
enough to support their core self-conceptions and preserve
their identity from disintegration (Sneed and Whitbourne
2003; Whitbourne et al. 2002).
Prior research on identity processes showed a positive link
between identity balance and adaptive psychological func-
tioning, whereas the opposite was found for identity accom-
modation (Polverino 2010; Sneed and Whitbourne 2003;
Westerhof et al. 2012; Whitbourne et al. 2002). Less consis-
tent associations were found for identity assimilation (Skultety
andWhitbourne 2004; Westerhof et al. 2012; Whitbourne and
Collins 1998).
Summary and Aim
The cognitive-processing perspective recognizes identity for-
mation as the process of collecting, evaluating, and organizing
information about the self (e.g., Berzonsky 1991; Grotevant
1987; Schwartz et al. 2005b). The current study focuses on
three cognitive-motivational variables that are known to pro-
mote meaning and integration of self-knowledge: need for
cognition, reflection, and integrative self-knowledge. Each
of these dispositions was positively linked psychological ad-
justment (Cacioppo et al. 1996; Ghorbani et al. 2008; Trapnell
and Campbell 1999). Two modes of reacting to self-related
discrepancies, which represent excessive forms of assimila-
tion and accommodation, and may result in the sort of biased
processing (Whitbourne 1986, 1996) – imperviousness and
over-responsiveness – are also included in the analysis. The
papers aims at describing how these factors might contribute
in strengthening or weakening a person’s sense of identity.
Specifically, it was hypothesized that higher need for cog-
nition would predict increased reflection (H1) and integrative
self-knowledge (H2), and that reflection and integrative self-
knowledge would be positively related to each other (H3).
Positive associations between need for cognition, reflection,
and integrative self-knowledge were previously reported by
others (Ghorbani et al. 2008, 2013a, b; Trapnell and Campbell
1999). It was also expected that those low in need for cogni-
tion would be more likely to be imbalanced in terms of assim-
ilation (H4) and accommodation (H5). The overuse of as-
similation is accompanied by lack of insight and defen-
sive rigidity, and the overuse of accommodation is
marked by reliance on others for self knowledge and
direction (Kroger 2002; Whitbourne 1986; Whitbourne et al.
2002) – all of which are characteristic of low-need-for-
cognition individuals (Cacioppo et al. 1996; Fletcher et al.
1986; Ghorbani et al. 2004).
Both, imperviousness and over-responsiveness were pre-
dicted to have negative impact on reflection (H6 and H7,
respectively) and on integrative self-knowledge (H8 and H9,
respectively). Those highly impervious to change (i.e., assim-
ilators) lack motivation to engage in introspection or self-
analysis because they do not value the outcomes nor do they
enjoy the process (Whitbourne 1986). The predicted negative
relationship of over-responsiveness with reflection is more
tenuous. The loss of inner integrity in excessive accommoda-
tors leads to self-doubt and low self-esteem, and can foster
self-focus, but it would probably take the form of neurotic
rumination rather than inquisitive reflection (Whitbourne
1986; Sneed and Whitbourne 2003). However, the two types
of self-focus tend to be positively correlated (Luyckx et al.
2007; Takano and Tanno 2009; Trapnell and Campbell 1999).
Based on previous findings (Berzonsky and Luyckx 2008;
Berzonsky and Sullivan 1992; Ghorbani et al. 2008; Johnson
and Nozick 2011; Luyckx et al. 2007; Luyckx et al. 2008;
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Njus and Johnson 2008), higher need for cognition, higher
reflection, and higher integrative self-knowledge each was
expected to contribute positively to sense of identity (H10,
H11, and H12, respectively). Such cognitive engagement
should enable individuals to be more open to self-experience,
more active in seeking and evaluating self-relevant informa-
tion, and more efficient in processing information about the
self, thereby more likely to resolve discrepancies within the
self-concept and to integrate self-relevant knowledge into a
meaningful whole. In keeping with identity process theory
(Whitbourne 1986; Whitbourne et al. 2002), which suggests
that identity accommodation is associated with a diffuse and
unstable identity, over-responsiveness was hypothesized to be
negatively predictive of sense of identity (H13). Conversely,
since identity assimilation provides escape from negative feel-
ings about one’s self and serves a protective function in pre-
serving one’s sense of continuity over time, imperviousness
was expected to be positively predictive of sense of identity
(H14). However, given the defensive nature of excessive as-




The data was collected as part of a larger research project. The
sample included 544 Polish students (59.4 % female) of dif-
ferent faculties and education institutions (universities and
higher professional schools), whose age ranged from 18 to
32 years (M = 21.29, SD = 1.46). Participants were informed
about the research’s purpose and were ensured about anonym-
ity and confidentiality. They completed measures of identity
and thinking dispositions, along with other questionnaires not
relevant to this study.
Measures
Sense of Identity To measure sense of personal identity ex-
tended form of the Multidimensional Questionnaire of
Identity1 (MQI; Pilarska 2012, 2014) was employed. This
45-item questionnaire consists of six subscales measuring
the strength of six identity-related senses (of having inner
contents, uniqueness, one’s own boundaries, coherence, con-
tinuity over time, and self-worth). All items (e.g., I feel that I
was once a very different person than I am now; It happens
that I perceive my close one as an important part of my self)
are evaluated on a 4-point scale from Bstrongly disagree/
never^ to Bstrongly agree/always^. In addition, the global
score (GSI) was computed by averaging scores across six
subscales.2 For this study’s sample, the Cronbach’s alpha co-
efficient for the overall scale was .80, and ranged from .60 to
.81 (average, .71) for individual subscales.
Need for Cognition Need for cognition was assessed via an
adapted version of the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS;
Cacioppo and Petty 1982; Matusz et al. 2011). The scale in-
cludes 36 items focusing on engagement in and enjoyment of
intellectual activities (e.g., I try to avoid situations that require
intensive thinking from me; I enjoy broadening my knowl-
edge about things); each evaluated on a 5-point scale from
Bstrongly disagree^ to Bstrongly agree^. In the present sample,
the Cronbach’s reliability coefficient of the NCS was α = .88.
Reflection Reflection, an openness-related form of self-focus,
was measured with the 8-item Reflection subscale of the
Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire – Shortform (RRQ
Shortforms; Trapnell 1997; translated version by Pilarska
and Suchańska 2013b). Every item (e.g., I love exploring
my Binner^ self) is presented on a 5-point scale, allowing for
a range of responses from Bstrongly disagree^ to Bstrongly
agree^. In the current sample the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
was .80.
Integrative Self-Knowledge The Integrative Self-
Knowledge Scale (ISK; Ghorbani et al. 2008; Polish
adaptation by Pilarska 2016) includes 12 items referring to
an individual’s efforts (1) to understand past experience (e.g.,
If I need to, I can reflect about myself and clearly understand
the feelings and attitudes behind my past behaviors), (2) to
maintain awareness of the self in the present (e.g., Most of
the time, I get so involved in what is going on that I really
cannot see how I am responding to a situation), and (3) to move
toward desired goals in the future (e.g., By thinking deeply
about myself, I can discover what I really want in life and
how I might get it). Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale,
ranging from Blargely untrue^ to Blargely true^. In this sample,
the Cronbach’s reliability coefficient of the ISK was .80.
Coping with Self-Related Discrepancies The Coping With
Discrepancies Scale (CWD) by Pilarska and Suchańska
(2013b) was used for measuring the two modes of responding
to discrepant information about the self. This tool consists of
15 yes-or-no statements. Imperviousness items (8 in total)
focus on attempts to minimize or deny the significance of a
1 A version of MQI modified by its author was used. The subscales of
specificity and stability were extended in order to improve their internal
consistencies and widen the range of thoughts, feelings or actions the
items in these subscales refer to.
2 For all multi-item measures, person-mean substitution was used to re-
place missing values for participants missing up to 20 % items in the
(sub)scale. For participants missing a greater number of items, the score
on that (sub)scale was not calculated.
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self-related discrepancy (e.g., After behaving contrary to my
principles, I try to erase it from my memory as soon as possi-
ble; How other people see me, does not particularly interest
me). Over-responsiveness items (7 in total) indicate that a
discrepancy has led to anxiety and self-doubt (e.g., When I
find myself in a new situation, I feel anxious that it may un-
dermine what I think about myself; When I see how different-
ly I react to various situation, I feel confusion and uncertainty).
For this study, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the two
subscales were moderate (but were the best that could be ob-
tained from this data): α = .64 for imperviousness and α = .52
for over-responsiveness.
Results
The basic statistical description of all variables is presented in
Table 1.3 The levels of skewness and kurtosis exhibited by the
data were below those that Kline (1998) specifies as problem-
atic (skewness: −0.40 to 0.62; kurtosis: −0.45 to 0.52). Gender
differences were examined by means of U Mann-Whitney
tests. As shown in Table 1, men received higher scores on
reflection and imperviousness to discrepant self-relevant in-
formation. Moreover, men, as compared to women, had
higher scores on sense of uniqueness, their own boundaries,
and self-worth. In terms of other variables, no significant gen-
der differences were observed.4
Table 2 contains zero-order correlations between cognitive-
motivational dispositions and senses of identity for the total
sample and for men and women separately. The obtained re-
sults are generally in line with expectations. Need for cogni-
tion, reflection, and integrative self-knowledge were all posi-
tively correlated with one another. The two modes of
responding to discrepant information about the self were neg-
atively associated with measures of active cognitive process-
ing, except for the correlation between over-responsiveness
and reflection. Expectedly, the two modes of coping were
inversely related to each other. There were no significant gen-
der differences between these correlation coefficients.
Global sense of identity showed positive associations with
need for cognition and integrative self-knowledge; and a neg-
ative association with over-responsiveness. The positive cor-
relation between global sense of identity and imperviousness
reached significance only for women. Fisher’s z-test indicated
that this association was significantly stronger in women than
in men (z = 2.22, p = .026).
Need for cognition correlated positively with all specific
identity senses. Small positive associations emerged between
reflection and senses of uniqueness and self-worth. The latter
association was not reliable (although in the predicted direc-
tion) for women ormen alone. For women only, reflectionwas
negatively associated with sense of coherence. Integrative
self-knowledge was consistently positively related to all spe-
cific identity senses. None of the above correlations were sig-
nificantly different for women and for men.
A consistent pattern of negative correlations was found
between over-responsiveness to discrepant self-relevant infor-
mation and all specific identity senses. The overall associa-
tions between imperviousness and specific identity senses
were small and reached significance only for sense of one’s
own boundaries. However, patterns of association differed for
men and women. There was a trend among women for imper-
viousness to be associated positively with specific identity
senses, although the correlation attained significance only
for senses of uniqueness and one’s own boundaries. With
the exception of the positive correlation with sense of one’s
own boundaries, imperviousness in men tended to be nega-
tively (although not significantly) related to specific identity
senses. Fisher’s z-test showed that the relationships of imper-
viousness with senses of having inner contents, uniqueness,
coherence, and self-worth were significantly different for
males and females (z = 1.99, p = .047; z = 2.61, p = .009;
z = 2.01, p = .045; and z = 2.41, p = .016, respectively).
Structural equation modeling was used to further examine
relationships between cognitive-motivational factors and
global sense of identity. The model estimation was performed
with maximum likelihood estimation. The error terms associ-
ated with the two subscales of the Coping With Discrepancies
Scale were allowed to covary. The findings revealed that the
over-responsiveness/reflection path was insignificant and was
deleted from the model. The lack of significant effect of over-
responsiveness on reflection replicated the correlation results,
and supported the reasoning outlined in the theoretical section.
The final model (Fig. 1) showed very good fit to the data, as
judged by goodness of fit estimates. The chi-square test,
χ2(1) = 0.28, p = .59, was insignificant. The GFI and AGFI
were both above their desired levels (GFI = 1.00 and AGFI
=1.00). The results for RMSEA and SRMR fell within range
of acceptable values (RMSEA =0.00 and SRMR=0.005). The
3 The data were screened for outliers using the so-called boxplot outlier
labeling rule. That rule declares observations as outliers if they lie outside
the interval ((Q1 - g(Q3 –Q1), Q3 + g(Q3 –Q1)), where g = 2.2 (Hoaglin
and Iglewicz 1987). Identified outliers (nine altogether) were removed
only from the particular measure; that is, individuals whose scores were
outliers on one measure were not removed on other measures in the
analyses. The results, however, were not sensitive to the removal of
outliers.
4 Due to the relatively wide age range of participants in this study, the
bivariate correlations between age and the other measures were also ex-
amined. The analyses for the total sample revealed only weak relation-
ships of age with need for cognition (r = .10, p = .024), reflection (r = .10,
p = .017), integrative self-knowledge (r = .09, p = .030), and sense of
coherence (r = .12, p = .005). However, given the intercorrelations among
cognitive-motivational and identity variables (see Table 2), the interpre-
tation of these relationships should be done with care. For example, the
positive association between age and sense of coherence did not hold
when controlling for need for cognition and integrative self-knowledge
(β = .07, p > .05). Full results are available on request.
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upper confidence limit for RMSEA was 0.09, and the
RMSEA-based test of close fit also indicated good fit
(p = .78).
The total R2 was .40 for global sense of identity, .28 for
integrative self-knowledge, .18 for reflection, .04 for impervi-
ousness, and .11 for over-responsiveness. The significant in-
direct effects are presented in standardized form in Table 3.5
Considering the total effects of all constructs on global sense
of identity, need for cognition exhibited the greatest influence
(total effect = .43, p < .001), followed by over-responsiveness
(total effect = − .39, p < .001) and integrative self-knowledge
(total effect = .35, p < .001). After adjusting for indirect ef-
fects, the total effects of imperviousness and reflection on
global sense of identity were determined to be insignificant
(total effect = .02 and −.06, ns, respectively).
Given the observed sex differences (see Tables 1 and 2), a
second set of analyses was conducted in which the invariance of
path coefficients across the two gender groupswas tested. A freely
estimated model was compared to a model in which the relations
between variables were set to be equal for women (n = 323) and
men (n = 221). The chi-square difference test was used to deter-
mine whether these models were equivalent. When these two
models were compared, there was a significant chi-square differ-
ence, Δχ2(Δdf = 15) = 61.89, p < .001. Thus, the relations be-
tween the variables were different for women and men.
The top panel of Fig. 2 shows the model for women
depicting the pathways from need for cognition to global
sense of identity, with modes of responding to discrepant
information about the self, reflection, and integrative self-
knowledge as potential mediators. The bottom panel shows
the model for men. The total R2 for prediction of global sense
of identity was .42 for women and .38 for men.
For women, there were direct paths from each cognitive-
motivational factor to global sense of identity (β range = −.09
to .34, p < .05). For men, there were no direct paths from
imperviousness and reflection to global sense of identity
(β = −.01 and β = −.11, ns, respectively). The majority of
the significant direct paths were of considerably high-
significance levels and in the expected direction. The one
exception was the negative direct effect of reflection on
women’s global sense of identity.
Integrative self-knowledge was the strongest direct predic-
tor of global sense of identity for both genders (β = .34 and
β = .35, p < .001 for women and men, respectively). Need for
cognition directly (β = .21 and β = .26, p < .001 for women
and men, respectively) and indirectly (total indirect effect =
.16 and .22, p < .001 for women and men, respectively) pre-
dicted integrative self-knowledge through modes of coping
and, for men only, reflection. Both the direct and total indirect
effects of need for cognition were positive and stronger for
males than for females (total effect = .37 and .48, p < .001 for
women and men, respectively). For both genders, though
more pronounced in males, need for cognition had its stron-
gest indirect effect via over-responsiveness (indirect effect =
.09 and .11, p < .001 for women and men, respectively).
Imperviousness alone mediated the relation between need
for cognition and integrative self-knowledge to a larger extent
among women than men (indirect effect = .06 and .04, p < .01
for women andmen, respectively). The indirect effects of need
for cognition via reflection and both imperviousness and
5 The Sobel tests (Sobel 1982) and the procedures described by Barron
and Kenny (1986) were used to evaluate statistical significance of indirect
effects (see also Taylor et al. 2008).
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
and Gender Differences for all
Measures
Variable Total sample Women Men U Z Effect size r
M SD M SD M SD
NC 127.65 17.45 127.55 17.13 127.79 17.94 34,348.50 -0.30 .01
REF 3.26 0.77 3.21 0.76 3.34 0.77 31,578.00* -2.12 .09
ISK 2.36 0.62 2.31 0.61 2.43 0.64 31,988.00 -1.72 .07
IP 0.31 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.34 0.26 29,899.00** -2.74 .12
OR 0.39 0.24 0.40 0.25 0.37 0.23 32,332.50 -1.28 .06
SIC 2.16 0.49 2.16 0.47 2.16 0.53 34,338.00 -0.16 .01
SU 1.72 0.49 1.66 0.50 1.79 0.46 28,724.50*** -3.25 .14
SOB 1.48 0.42 1.45 0.42 1.54 0.42 29,606.50* -2.33 .10
SC 1.91 0.45 1.92 0.42 1.90 0.48 33,719.50 -0.57 .02
SCT 1.88 0.40 1.88 0.38 1.88 0.43 33,643.50 -0.40 .02
SSW 1.97 0.47 1.93 0.46 2.02 0.48 30,485.00* -2.27 .10
GSI 1.85 0.32 1.83 0.30 1.89 0.35 31,474.00 -1.64 .07
NC = need for cognition, REF = reflection, ISK = integrative self-knowledge, IP = imperviousness, OR = over-
responsiveness, SIC = sense of having inner contents, SU = sense of uniqueness, SOB = sense of one’s own
boundaries, SC = sense of coherence, SCT = sense of continuity over time, SSW = sense of self-worth,


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reflection in series reached significance only for men (indirect
effect = .06, p = .003 and .01, p = .041, respectively). The
effects of need for cognition on integrative self-knowledge via
reflection did differ significantly between the gender groups
(t = 2.08, p = .038). Over-responsiveness was the strongest
direct predictor of integrative self-knowledge (β = −.28 and
β = −.34, p < .001 for women and men, respectively), follow-
ed by imperviousness (β = −.28 and β = −.22, p < .001 for
women and men, respectively). Among men, but not women,
the indirect effect of imperviousness, operating through reflec-
tion was significant (indirect effect = − .04, p = .007), yielding
a total effect of imperviousness on integrative self-knowledge
of −.29 and −.26 for women and men, respectively (p < .001).
These findings suggested that, in men, the diminishing influ-
ence of over-responsiveness on integrative self-knowledge
was more pronounced (as compared to the influence of imper-
viousness), whereas in women the two effects were about the
same size. Also only among men, reflection directly and pos-
itively predicted integrative self-knowledge (β = .17,
p < .001); the difference between regression coefficients in
men and women was marginally significant (t = 1.89,
p = .059). The total R2 for prediction of integrative self-
knowledge was .25 for women and .36 for men.
Reflection directly and negatively influenced women’s
global sense of identity (β = −.09, p = .042), while indirectly
– operating via integrative self-knowledge – and positively
affected men’s global sense of identity (indirect effect = .06,
p = .004). The latter effect was marginally stronger for men
when compared to women (t = 1.76, p = .078). For women as
well as men, the direct and indirect effects of reflectionwere in
opposite directions and canceled each other out, resulting in a
non-significant total effect (total effect = − .08 and −.05, ns for
women and men, respectively). For both genders, reflection
was positively predicted by need for cognition (β = .26 and
β = .34, p < .001 for women and men, respectively) and
negatively by imperviousness (β = −.29 and β = −.23
p < .001 for women and men, respectively). Imperviousness
also acted as a mediator in the relationship of need for cogni-
tion and reflection (indirect effect = .06 and .04, p < .01 for
women and men, respectively). Overall, reflection was more
closely related to need for cognition (total effect = .32 and .38,
p < .001 for women and men, respectively) than to impervi-
ousness, especially among men. The total R2 for prediction of
reflection was .17 for women and .21 for men.
For both genders, the two modes of responding to discrepant
information about the self were negatively predicted by need for
cognition. However, need for cognition was a more potent pre-
dictor of over-responsiveness (9.7 % and 14.0 % of variance
explained for women and men, respectively) than of impervi-
ousness (4.3 % and 3.4 % of variance explained for women and
men, respectively). Imperviousness was positively and directly
predictive for women’s global sense of identity (β = .17,
p < .001), but not for men’s. The difference between regression
coefficients in men and women was significant (t = 2.53,
p = .012). Global sense of identity was influenced by impervi-
ousness also indirectly through integrative self-knowledge (in-
direct effect = − .10 and −.08, p < .001 for women and men,
respectively) and, among men only, through reflection and in-
tegrative self-knowledge operating in serial (indirect effect
= − .01, p = .015). The total indirect effect was for both genders
of the same magnitude of .07 (p < .01) and was negative, pri-
marily because higher imperviousness reduced integrative self-
knowledge, which led to lower sense of identity. The total effect
of imperviousness on global sense of identity was opposite in
direction, but failed to reach significance for both females and
males (total effect = .09 and −.08, ns, respectively). Regardless
the gender, over-responsiveness affected global sense of identity
negatively directly (β = −.25 andβ = −.34, p < .001 for women
and men, respectively) and indirectly via integrative self-
knowledge (indirect effect = − .10 and .12, p < .001 for women
and men, respectively). Both direct and indirect effects of over-
responsiveness were more pronounced in men that in women.
Need for cognition had both direct (β = .24 and β = .20,
p < .001 for women andmen, respectively) and indirect effects
(indirect effect = .15 and .24, p < .001 for women and men,
respectively) on global sense of identity. The indirect effect
was marginally greater for men (t = 1.78, p = .075). The total
effect of need for cognition on global sense of identity was .39
and .45 for women and men, respectively (p < .001). For both
genders, need for cognition had the strongest indirect effect on
global sense of identity via over-responsiveness acting as a
single mediator (indirect effect = .08 and .11, p < .001 for
women and men, respectively). Need for cognition also
showed an indirect effect via integrative self-knowledge act-
ing as the sole mediator (indirect effect = .07 and .09, p < .001
for women and men, respectively) as well as both over-
responsiveness and integrative self knowledge (indirect effect























Fig. 1 The final model. N = 544.
Standardized path coefficients are
shown; all these coefficients were
significant at p < .05 or less
Curr Psychol
imperviousness and integrative self-knowledge (indirect ef-
fect = .02 and .01, p < .01 for women and men, respectively)
as serial mediators. Only among men, reflection – acting in
sequence with integrative self-knowledge – mediated the re-
lationship of need for cognition and global sense of identity
(indirect effect = .02, p < .009). Only among women, the
positive effect of need for cognition on global sense of identity
was suppressed by the significant negative indirect effect via
imperviousness (indirect effect = − .03, p = .013). The path
from need for cognition to global sense of identity through
imperviousness was stronger for women when compared to
men (t = 2.14, p = .033), whereas the path through reflection
and integrative self-knowledge operating as serial mediators
was stronger for men than women (t = 1.97, p = .050).
Overall, among the fourteen hypotheses proposed, ten were
supported (H1, H2, H4, H5, H6, H8, H9, H10, H12, and H13)
and two – concerning the effect of over-responsiveness on
reflection (H7) and the effect of reflection on sense of identity
(H11) – were not supported by the above results. The other
two hypotheses were partially supported – the expected
Table 3 Indirect Effects for the
Final Structural Equation Model Path Dependent construct
REF ISK GSI
Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE
NC → IP .0484*** .0006 .0454*** .0004 -.0175* .0002
NC → OR – – .0996*** .0006 .0942*** .0003
NC → REF – – .0302* .0004 -.0275* .0002
NC → ISK – – – – .0821*** .0003
NC → IP → REF – – .0050* .0001 -.0045* .0000
NC → IP → ISK – – – – .0159*** .0001
NC → OR→ ISK – – – – .0348*** .0001
NC → REF → ISK – – – – .0106* .0001
NC → IP → REF → ISK – – – – .0017* .0000
REF → ISK – – – – .0358* .0061
IP → REF – – -.0254* .0279 .0232* .0131
IP → ISK – – – – -.0815*** .0220
IP → REF → ISK – – – – -.0089* .0052
OR→ ISK – – – – -.1046*** .0242
NC = need for cognition, REF = reflection, ISK = integrative self-knowledge, IP = imperviousness, OR = over-















































Fig. 2 Structural models for
women a and men b. Path




remaining paths were significant
at the p < .05 level or better
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association between reflection and integrative self-knowledge
(H3), and between imperviousness and sense of identity (H14)
appeared to be conditional on gender.
Discussion
One of the core ideas underlying many theories of personality
is that construction of a stable and coherent identity is crucial
part of healthy development (e.g., Freud 2005; Lecky 1945;
Rogers 1959). As Erikson (1980) noted, the subjective expe-
rience of identity actually gives rise to a preconscious sense of
personal well-being. Identity issues have been of considerable
interest over the last decades due to the changing nature of the
modern world and the need for new understandings of identi-
ty. The focus of this paper was to propose and test a model that
addresses the potential role of cognitive-motivational factors
in relation to sense of identity. The model was based upon the
notion, well grounded in theoretical and empirical research,
that a sense of identity emerges from cognitive processing of
self-relevant information (e.g., Berzonsky 1991; Bosma and
Kunnen 2001; Whitbourne 1986). Gender differences in rela-
tionships between cognitive-motivational factors and personal
identity were also examined, although no predictions about
the direction of the differences were made.
Most hypotheses concerning relationships among
cognitive-motivational factors and their impact on personal
identity were supported. Correlation analyses revealed, as ex-
pected and consistent with other studies (e.g., Berzonsky and
Sullivan 1992; Njus and Johnson 2008), that active cognitive
processing – especially efforts to integrate self-experience
across time – was positively related to sense of identity.
Correlations of reflection and senses of identity were more
limited and less consistent. Reflection did correlate
positively with sense of uniqueness, which is in line with the
finding of Trapnell (1995) who showed that similarity ratings
decreased with increasing reflection. Reflection was also pos-
itively correlated with sense of self-worth in the entire group,
but not in women or men alone. In females only, an increase in
reflection was associated with a decrease in sense of coher-
ence. This was contrary to theoretical expectations, but con-
sistent with studies indicating that reflection is negatively as-
sociated with self-concept clarity (Campbell et al. 1996;
Johnson and Nozick 2011).
Growths of all specific identity senses and global sense of
identity were consistently accompanied by a decrease in over-
responsiveness to self-related discrepancies, as predicted from
Whitbourne’s identity processing theory (Whitbourne et al.
2002). Imperviousness was largely unrelated to identity vari-
ables, but showed a positive association with sense of one’s
own boundaries, suggesting that one’s resistance to acknowl-
edge identity-discrepant experiences or incorporate new self-
related information may be seen as an attempt to strengthen
one’s sense of boundaries. Yet the patterns of associations
differed by gender such that for women, higher impervious-
ness was also associated with stronger sense of uniqueness
and global sense of identity, whereas for men no such
relationships emerged. Given the crucial role of self-esteem
in identity dynamics (e.g., Schwartz et al. 2005a;
Vignoles et al. 2002), this result concurs somewhat with
Skultety and Whitbourne (2004), who reported that identity
assimilation was positively associated with self-esteem for
women only.
The model describing the associations between cognitive-
motivational factors and sense of personal identity was also
verified by means of path analysis. Results were generally
supportive of the theoretical model and consistent with corre-
lation findings.
As expected, need for cognition proved to be a powerful
positive predictor of global sense of identity. However, nearly
half of its total effect was due to indirect effects. It also became
apparent that need for cognition could have both positive and
negative indirect effects on identity, mediated by different fac-
tors. On one hand, higher need for cognition was associated
with higher integrative self-knowledge and lower over-re-
sponsiveness, which had positive effects on sense of identity.
On the other hand, higher need for cognition predicted higher
reflection and lower imperviousness, which in turn contribut-
ed to weaker sense of identity, but these effects were not
strong enough to nullify the overall beneficial impact of need
for cognition on global sense of identity.
Substantial impacts of over-responsiveness and integrative
self-knowledge on global sense of identity were also evident.
Consistent with what was expected, increased integrative self-
knowledge was directly related to enhanced global sense of
identity, while greater over-responsiveness was directly relat-
ed to lowered sense of identity. Over-responsiveness was also
found to predict integrative self-knowledge, with lower over-
responsiveness predicting higher integrative self-knowledge.
Additionally, the model captured two conflicting effects of
reflection on global sense of identity: heightened reflection
directly contributed to weaker sense of identity, but also to
increased integrative self-knowledge, which was associated
with stronger sense of identity. Ultimately, because the direct
and indirect effects canceled each other out, the total effect of
reflection on global sense of identity was insignificant.
Opposite effects were found for imperviousness as well.
Higher imperviousness had beneficial impact on sense of
identity, both directly and by reducing reflection. However,
in both cases it resulted also in decreased integrative self-
knowledge, thus indirectly lowering global sense of identity.
Once again, the conflicting effects canceled each other out and
produced a nonsignificant total effect of imperviousness.
In the final phase of the data analysis, the multi-sample
analysis was used to determine whether there weremeaningful
gender differences in the relationships between variables. The
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models for women and men were rather alike, which was not
surprising since the general model have demonstrated a very
good model fit. However, some differences were observed.
For both genders, integrative self-knowledge, compared to
the other constructs examined, had the highest direct effect on
global sense of identity, followed by over-responsiveness and
need for cognition. The magnitude of the latter effect was
slightly (not significantly) higher in women than in men.
The overall indirect relationship between need for cognition
and global sense of identity was positive in both groups, but
appeared to be marginally stronger for men. The main reason
for this difference was that the positive need for cognition’s
effects mediated by over-responsiveness and integrative self-
knowledge were slightly greater for men compared to women.
In addition, among women, the indirect path from need for
cognition to imperviousness to global sense of identity was
that high levels of need for cognition were associated with low
levels of imperviousness, which in turn were associated with
low levels of global sense of identity. The total effect of need
for cognition on global sense of identity was numerically, but
not significantly, greater in males. Over-responsiveness to
self-related discrepancies was also found to be somewhat
more relevant for men’s than for women’s global sense of
identity. Both direct and indirect (through integrative self-
knowledge) links between over-responsiveness and global
sense of identity were apparently, although – again – not sig-
nificantly, stronger for men than women.
The above results highlight need for cognition as a potent
contributor to sense of personal identity, thus providing further
support to the role of intrinsic cognitive motivation in self-
understanding and self-regulation (e.g., Berzonsky and
Sullivan 1992; Campbell et al. 1996; Cacioppo et al. 1996;
Trapnell and Campbell 1999). An individual’s enjoyment of
and motivation to engage in effortful cognitive processing
enhances one’s self-reflective capacities, non-defensive reli-
ance on internal referents, and teleological coherence, each
of which, alone or in combination, impacts one’s sense of
identity. Across the sexes, the detrimental effects appear to
accompany excessive reliance on accommodation, though
they might be more painful for men, possibly because women
(at least inWestern societies) are more likely to be encouraged
to be attentive and responsive to others (Cross and Madson
1997; Li 2002; Madson and Trafimow 2001), and, as has been
shown by some studies (e.g., Gurin et al. 1978; Itzhaky and
Ribner 1999), they tend to be more externally oriented.
Furthermore, the results from the multi-sample analysis
shed more light on the relationships between reflection, im-
perviousness to self-related discrepancies, and sense of iden-
tity. For women, it appeared that imperviousness had a direct
beneficial effect, while reflection had a direct adverse effect on
global sense of identity. For men these effects were only indi-
rect and their direction was opposite. Imperviousness indirect-
ly weakened men’s global sense of identity by reducing
reflection and integrative self-knowledge, while reflection in-
directly enhanced men’s global sense of identity by promoting
integrative self-knowledge.
These findings may indicate that women and men differ in
their use of assimilation in maintaining sense of identity.
Although men were more likely to deal with discrepant infor-
mation about themselves by minimizing or denying its signif-
icance, only for women such a way of coping provided a
means of strengthening their sense of identity. Yet, this was
accomplished somewhat at the expense of suppressing the
reflective and integrative functions of the self; the same effect
to which men were susceptible. Skultety and Whitbourne
(2004), when commenting on the positive link of identity
assimilation with self-esteem among women, elaborated on
the Bdouble standard^ in society. They state that, because
women’s value in our society is more closely tied to their
appearance than is that of men, women’s identities may be
more challenged by age-related changes in physical function-
ing and appearance. Thus, women benefit from identity as-
similation more so than men do. Another way to understand
the positive effect of imperviousness on women’s global sense
of identity is in the context of the present findings that women
had a weaker sense of their own boundaries thanmen, and that
assimilative coping and sense of one’s own boundaries were
positively related. Since the females’ self-concepts tend to be
more relational and interdependent than those of men (e.g.,
Cross and Madson 1997; Madson and Trafimow 2001), as-
similation (even if excessive) appears to be a mechanism that
allows women to secure their fragile boundaries, and protect
their sense of personal identity, albeit denial might not be the
most optimal strategy.
As for the gender difference in the role of reflection, some
research suggested that women may be higher than man in
private self-consciousness (e.g., Alanazi 2001; Realo and
Allik 1998; Scheier and Carver 1985). There is also some
evidence that self-focus is more likely to affect women’s emo-
tional experience (Flett et al. 1986; Mor and Winquist 2002),
and that experimentally induced self-reflection is more likely
to influence self-clarity for women than for men (Csank and
Conway 2004). In the current study, contrary to that of
Trapnell and Campbell (1999) and Zanon and Teixeira
(2006), but in line with Luyckx et al.’s (2007) results, men
reported engaging in reflection more than women did.
Moreover, in men reflection facilitated the temporal integra-
tion of personal past, present, and future, resulting in a stron-
ger sense of identity, whereas in women engaging in reflection
appeared to decrease their sense of identity. Thus, although it
is generally agreed that reflection contributes to psychological
adjustment (e.g., Elliott and Coker 2008; Takano and Tanno
2009; Thomsen et al. 2011; Trapnell and Campbell 1999), it
might be that for women particularly, reflection should not be
considered purely adaptive. The fact that reflection and rumi-
nation are often found to correlate with each other (e.g.,
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Luyckx et al. 2007; Takano and Tanno 2009), and that self-
focus and negative affect tend to be more strongly related in
female-dominated samples (Mor and Winquist 2002) add
some support to this conclusion.
In sum, the data provide strong evidence for substantial
contribution of cognitive-motivational factors to sense of per-
sonal identity. Taken together with previous research in this
area, the findings add to a growing body of literature that
empirically demonstrates the importance of active cognitive
engagement in identity formation. Present results also indicate
that certain kinds of cognitive processing, including impervi-
ousness to self-related discrepancies and reflection, may have
somewhat different implications for the two sexes.
The novelty of this study was its focus on the simultaneous
effects of various cognitive-motivational factors, both adap-
tive and maladaptive. Structural equation modeling allowed to
go beyond examining bivariate relations and provided insight
into the way that observed correlations between cognitive-
motivational and identity variables can be decomposed into
direct and indirect effects. This approach proved especially
valuable in the case of reflection, whose adaptive nature re-
mains controversial (Şimşek et al. 2013; Takano and Tanno
2009). Furthermore, since most identity researchers have
employed Marcia’s (1966) identity-status paradigm and its
extensions, within which the subjective experiential aspect
of identity has tended to be neglected (see Blasi and Glodis
1995; Schwartz 2005), it is worth noting that the proposed
conceptualization of identity emphasizes a person’s self-
experience and self-understanding, and relates to the phenom-
enological perspective.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are a few limitations to the current study. First, the study
included Polish young adults only. The relative homogeneity of
the sample provided a more rigorous test of hypotheses and
allowed fewer confounding variables to interfere, but limited
generalization of findings to other demographic and cultural
contexts. It is possible that the identity process itself operates
differently and relative salience of sources of self-knowledge
varies by social characteristic such as age and ethnicity. There
is, for example, evidence that individuals from primarily collec-
tivist cultures (or those with an interdependent self-construal)
may be more likely than those from primarily individualistic
cultures (or those with an independent self-construal) to per-
ceive social sources (i.e., reflected appraisal, social comparison)
as more important to self-knowledge than introspection (Suh
2007; Tafarodi et al. 2004). Certainly, a replication of the present
results with more diverse samples is warranted.
Another limitation could be the method used to assess the
two modes of responding to discrepant information about the
self. Although the CWD scale demonstrated an adequate fit to
the factor structure, the reliability was not as high as desired or
expected for either subscale. The relatively low internal con-
sistency, especially of the over-responsiveness subscale,
which may have been partly due to the small number of items
in the subscale, calls for caution of interpretation and further
evaluation of the usefulness of the CWD scale.
Also, this study did not measure many of the personality
variables potentially impacting the cognition–identity link
(see, Sedikides and Skowronski 1995) as well as other psy-
chological and social factors which may facilitate or impede
the development and maintenance of a sense of identity. It is
worth noting, that although the overall fit of the model was
good, it left a significant amount of variance still to be ex-
plained. This suggests that there is important variability in
sense of identity that is not captured by the cognitive-
motivational mechanisms examined in this study, and pro-
vides support for the further investigation into identity forma-
tion and dynamics.
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